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This paper intends to explore issues of trust and control, as they emerged from the 
labour process debate, in the context of management restructuring in Transformation 
Economies. On the basis of ethnographic research in post-soviet manufacturing 
industry, the paper will present problems faced by managers and owners in carrying 
out restructuring, unveil the contradictions that constrain their relationship and 
identify the nature of the social transformation at work in the process. The paper will 
contend that critical agency theory (Armstrong 1984, 1989, 199) is the best suited tool 
in problematising the ownership-management relationship in this context. The post-
soviet context in turn, with capitalist transition still in its early stages, represents an 
ideal field for operationalising this approach. The peculiarity of the soviet economic 
system rests in the limited control by the elites over the production process, which, in 
turn, translates into a conflictual and mistrustful relationship within management. The 
emergence of outside ownership in privatised enterprises introduces a new dimension 
to this contradiction. This calls for problematising managerial issues of control and 
decision-making, keeping in sight the way in which managerial work occurs in the 
circuit of capital. 
 
Management and ownership in the post-soviet industrial landscape 
The history of soviet management in the decades preceding the fall of the SU, trough 
transition to present, has been one of continuous tensions, conflict and resistance to 
pressures from above. The most significant difference being that, while in the soviet 
period western analysts discounted soviet managerial practices vis-à-vis the 
irrationality of the command system and praised their attempt at freeing enterprises 
from bureaucratic ministerial interference, they switched sides after transition.  
Transition to a market economy gained momentum with mass privatisation in 1993 
which initially took the form of employee‟s ownership, in fact managerial insider‟s 
control. Western economists and liberal commentators blamed red executives for 
encroaching on assets, luring employees to retain control, and ultimately blocking 
transition by procrastinating restructuring. Focusing on corporate governance they 
saw outside ownership as the only solution to alleged managerial resistance to 
transition. The second half of the last decade has seen a change of hands with new 
private financial-industrial groups taking over much of the industry. The appearance 
of capitalist owners has not extinguished tensions but given managerial resistance a 
more familiar face opposing enterprise middle and lower managers to group level top 
executives (Johnson, 1997). Managerial resistance in the post-soviet space, as 
opposed to other post-socialist economies, has raised issues about cultural and 
institutional legacies as a key explanatory factor. Managerial resistance in Russia 
represents therefore a significant case to explore issues of identity and resistance in 
management.  
Marxist scholars on the other hand have observed how the break up of the command 
economy did not at first yield the sudden appearance of capitalist practices and 
institutions but a „marketisation‟ led by speculative elements transferring resources 
from production to circulation (Burawoy, 2001). This has left the soviet enterprise and 
its mode of operation more or less intact. Research findings based on the appreciation 
of Marxist labour process theory highlight how this is the product of a specific system 
of social relations, inducing co-operation of line managers and cadre workers to 
control labour but also to resist the scrutiny and the demands of owners (Clarke, 1995, 
1996). The direct involvement of financial industrial groups into production, 
following the 1998 crisis, has provided grounds for interpreting post-soviet 
transformation in Russia in terms of „capitalist development‟ as well as the possibility 
of identifying its current limitations and challenges (Clarke, 2004, 2007; Schwartz, 
2007). Managerial behaviour in these approaches is a rational response to their 
contradictory position as controllers but also increasingly as controlled. Their 
resistance has much more to do with the limited penetration of capital in production. 
Findings from our fieldwork research bear also witness to the dissatisfaction of both 
owners and top managers with the current situation, and their growing awareness of 
the need for change, yet also of the limit posed by the existing system of 
administration characterised by control and mistrust (Morrison, 2007a, 2007b). 
In this article we will maintain that the current struggle over restructuring between 
owners and managers highlights the profound gulf existing between them while any 
change in production presupposes an alignment of interests between owners and 
managers over the pursuit of controlling labour, ultimately achieving „the real 
subsumption of labour under capital‟ (Clarke, 2007, p. 241).   
In the first part of the article we will look at the form in which the ownership–
management relationship exists in the capitalist system with a critical exploration of 
the Armstrong-Willmott debate around the managerial labour process. Armstrong 
critical agency approach singles out managers as control agents and centres the 
managerial social relationship owners on control strategies and trust with owners. 
Managerial agency is not buried under a functionalist control thesis but enhanced by 
an historical analysis of professions as a collective agent of capitalist control. In stark 
opposition, Willmott attempts at constructing a labour process approach to 
management focused on individual identities and based on the appreciation of 
ambiguity and resistance found in Critical theory, coming to reject entirely any 
distinction between managers and workers. The second part of the article is devoted to 
an analysis of trust, control and deskilling in Russian manager-owner relations which 
will test the explanatory potentials of Armstrong‟s agency approach to managers as 
control agents vis-à-vis Willmott‟s view of managerial ambiguous identities. The 
evidence base relies extensively but not exclusively on findings from case-study 
ethnographic research in post-soviet management, enterprise restructuring and labour 
(including my own) carried out within the framework of the Russian research 
programme at Warwick. 
Exploring how trust and control function within the management–ownership 
relationship and understanding its contradictions will clarify the undertaking of 
restructuring in post-socialism at the practical level as well as its theoretical 
implications for the position of capitalist management and the plausibility of 
resistance. 
Agency, Trust and Control: the management problem in LPT 
Mainstream approaches provide little basis to understand conflict and contradictions 
in management, yet Marxist labour process seems equally ill equipped to explore 
management and explain manager agency in our context, i.e. it has a lot to say about 
manager-worker relations but fails to look into the ownership-manager relationship. 
In fact, has been observed that many contributions to the Labour Process Theory 
(LPT) debate took a functionalist approach to management or, worse, reduced 
management to a mere capitalist function, basically conflating the two (Armstrong, 
1984; Willmott, 1997). 
The need arises therefore for an approach that consistently with a Marxist analysis of 
the labour process (Thompson, K., 1984; Knights, 1990) might explain management 
as a contradictory relationship within capitalism, open the managerial black box and 
advance beyond both bourgeois reductionism and orthodox functionalism.  
 
Critical agency approach to manager-owner relationship 
The possibility of problematising managerial issues of control and decision-making 
without losing sight of the fact that real managerial work occurs in the circuit of 
capital, it will be argued here, is best dealt with in the context of a „critical agency 
theory‟ (CAT) (Armstrong, 1991).  
Armstrong first highlights that mainstream managerial approaches provide little help 
in this respect as they fail to recognise: (a) the specificity of the British and American 
conception of management, which conveys the notion of a function in its own right, 
„exclusively identified with planning the profitable deployment of capital . . . and with 
the . . . control of subordinates to that end‟ (Armstrong, 1989, p. 310); (b) the 
„identification of management with capital functions‟, which is to say that 
„management cannot be regarded as a predefined set of tasks and functions. . . Instead, 
it is a matter of acting so as to further the aims of more senior managers (and 
ultimately, ownership) (ibid., p. 311). Secondly, his theorising is explicitly aimed at 
overcoming the risk of reducing management to a mere control function, by designing 
a historically founded autonomous dynamic of managerial development (Armstrong, 
1984). Thirdly, it is concerned with avoiding the fallacies of post-structuralist 
revisionism. What he foresees as the „depressing prospect‟ of falling into theoretical 
speculations generating „venerable pseudo-problems concerned with the 
mismanagement of management‟ (Armstrong, 1989, pp. 310–12). A prospect he sees 
within the labour process debate, specifically in relation to the emergence of critical 
management, should management be analysed as a labour process. This will not only 
obscure the real contradictions in capitalist management but, proceeding in this way, 
endanger the very possibility of class analysis; as in fact, if everything is merely 
labour process, capital disappears, i.e. it becomes impossible to identify the activities 
that are distinctively capitalist and the distortions they induce in the labour process. 
So, for example, Taylorism becomes simply a form of division of labour and 
unproductive labour ceases to exist as a category. Yet the problematic nature of 
management remains and requires a theoretical approach. This is better understood as 
a „particular manifestation of the struggle for control within capital and . . . the 
conceptual key to understanding this is agency‟ (ibid., p. 310). 
The main assumptions of CAT are that managerial tasks cannot be separated from 
„managerial social relationships‟ and, therefore, „the managerial problem‟, from the 
point of view of ownership, „is not one of expertise but of agency‟ (ibid., pp. 311–12). 
However, classical agency theory is based on a paradigm of individual utility 
maximisation and it is mainly concerned with the design of appropriate incentive and 
monitoring systems aimed at aligning managerial interests with that of the owners in 
order to fight opportunism, identified with an undetermined concept of moral hazard.  
A critical approach, instead, starts from the idea that principals have to trust someone 
and in the context of complex capitalist organisations owners have to trust managers 
since they cannot trust workers! Monitoring and incentives do not eliminate the need 
for trust, which becomes the term on which this contradictory relationship hinges. Yet 
the social construction of trust, its commodification, is expensive, and employers are 
tempted to dispense with it on economic grounds. The history of capitalist 
organisations is characterised by the dynamics of control and trust. The development 
of management can be understood in terms of a) attempts by owners to solve the 
agency problem, but b) driven by competition between agents interested in securing 
„the loyalty dividends‟ attached to high trust positions. The main function of new 
managerial professions is to provide principals with economies, derived from 
replacing trust with control of existing agents and delegating routine elements of 
managerial work to subordinates, ultimately achieving greater control over labour.  
The major contribution of this conception to a comparative perspective consists in 
highlighting the agency, i.e. socially active, role played by managers themselves in 
designing control strategies; secondly, in maintaining that such strategies succeeded 
in winning employers‟ support because they responded to the need for capital to 
increase control and profit extraction from enterprises. At this level of generalisation, 
such an approach appears an interesting toolbox to explore the managerial problem in 
Russia.  
Yet, except for one if its corollaries – the idea of intra-professional competition as a 
key historical aspect of management development - CAT is far from being widely 
accepted. In fact, it suffered major criticism by Willmott (1997, pp. 1335-1338), who 
instead made the use of LPT in the study of management the centrepiece of his 
poststructuralist reconstruction of labour process theory and the disproval of 
Armstrong‟s „manager-agent-of-capital thesis‟ (and Burowoy‟s revisionism) a key 
step towards this aim. Though the clash between Armstrong‟s CAT and Willmott‟s 
LPT might well be considered far from being the sole or even the most illuminating 
moment in the debate about trust and control in management, it serves two key tasks 
in the further elaboration of our post-soviet management case: 1) to focus on key 
options about how the issue should be approached‟ 2) to highlight what is 
theoretically at stake.  
 
Willmott’s critique: what and why 
A line of reasoning that is admittedly poststructuralist and aimed at nothing less than 
putting identity and subjectivity „in an existential sense‟ at the heart of LPT (ibid., p. 
1346), such as the one of Willmott, should, de rigueur, prompt an immediate 
refutation on the grounds that: its critique of Marxism and the wholehearted 
embracement of Critical Theory has long signalled a definite break with LPT 
formalised in the definition of an alternative agenda, Critical Management (Alvesson 
& Willmott, 2003); in turn, punctual ripostes by key LPT theorists to the claims of 
CM and CT have built into a now substantially comprehensive critique (Thompson & 
Smith, 2000). However, other than the timely coincidence with Armstrong own return 
to the topic (Armstrong, 2008), there is more than one reason for considering 
Willmott‟s challenges to CAT. These are: a) the theoretical „stratagems‟ he employs, 
reflecting the more general, and still largely influential, mode of operation of 
poststructuralist thinking (and Marxism challenging) in the social sciences (Brennan, 
2006; Knights & Willmott, 2007), b) the possibility it offers to unearth limits and 
potentials of Armstrong‟s own propositions; c) and ultimately the advances that a 
recovery of subjectivity and even identity can play in reinvigorating an historical 
account of capitalist management, but also the risks this poses once assumed within a 
poststructuralist agenda. We will touch on each of these points separately and 
succinctly. 
 
Willmott’s critique: the stratagems of poststructuralism 
For an argument whose main thrust is admittedly revision on a grand scale and whose 
target is orthodoxy one would not expect appeals to the founding fathers as the key 
weaponry of its critique. Yet this is precisely what W. does, first recalling Marx‟s and 
Braverman‟s inclusion of management in „collective labour‟, then arguing against 
Burawoy‟s obliteration of the „orthodox stratagem‟ of neatly separating the objective 
from the subjective dimensions of capitalist reproduction. This is essential in 
„sanctifying‟, as he himself put it, the idea that management should be considered a 
labour process. But more importantly, to seal the structural dimension of capitalist 
domination, and the managerial role in it, within the paralysing circularity of 
functionalist abstraction from which the very contributions of Armstrong and 
Burawoy have tried to disentangle it. In fact, with a number of theoretical twists, W. 
restates the „heuristically and politically useful distinction between “productive” and 
“unproductive” labour‟ (ibid., p. 1336) or the „vitally important . . . methodological 
stratagem of orthodox labour process theory‟ (ibid., p. 1340) only to denounce their 
actual irrelevance in appreciating human agency. This is, though, not a simple and 
agreeable reinstatement of the limits of a quite dated Marxist orthodoxy, as we shall 
see.  
What we observe here, following Brennan‟s argument about the cultural politics of 
CT (2006), is the poststructuralist stratagem of appropriating Marxism only to deprive 
it of much of its sense because of a shift from a „system of belief‟ to one of „being‟, or 
in simpler terms a replacement of class with identity politics. Willmott‟s (2007, p. 
1369) „appreciation‟ of „struggles‟ encompassing „gender, sexuality, ethnicity, 
religion, ageism, ecology and anti-globalization‟ comes as a confirmation of such a 
hypothesis. At a more immediate level, it can be observed how each and every of 
them as well as their ensemble represent a universally recognised manifestation in 
politics of that „cultural shift‟1. And something that was poised to supplant, rather than 
to run along class politics. Epistemologically, placing such „forms of inequality‟ 
together, and in pair with class becomes possible only once the understanding of the, 
very different, scope and depth of social structures in which they are generated is 
obliterated (Armstrong, 2008, p. 5). This is in turn the result of a shift in focus from 
labour to identity and, ontologically, from social relations to the „embodied‟ subject. 
The nude body and its solitary consciousness become the „site‟ where these 
„contradictions‟ are inscribed by „power‟, „incorporated and re-enacted by the subject 
which comes to resemble the „subaltern‟ of postcolonial studies. Like the latter, the 
manager of Willmott is flawed by an irreconcilable duality purported as a site of 
resistance and yet the victim of a foucaultian power. Not surprisingly W. attaches a 
tragic dimension to it. Further evidence of this a theoretical shift is represented by a 
parallel semantic shift in the form of a proliferation of metaphors, which pays homage 
to poststructuralist logocentrism and fundamental ambiguity (Brennan, 2006, p. 4). 
So, the managerial condition is revealed at any one time as „contradictory, 
problematic, contested, and equivocal‟; in their relation to capital, managers are 
defined as „sellers of labour, agents and targets of control, fuelled and exploited by 
employers‟, and their reaction appears as „recalcitrance‟ yet „partial, ambivalent and 
not infrequently dramaturgical‟ (Willmott, 1997, p. 1349). Despite the explicit 
endorsement of Thompson and McHugh to a „managerial labour process . . . “as long 
as the connection to the dominant capital labour contradiction are maintained . . .” 
(ibid., p. 1337)‟, the strong poststructuralist imprint of this intellectual endeavour 
seems rather to suggest that „LPT concepts are utilized only as a “grammar or 
vocabulary” (Thompson & Ackroyd, 2005, p. 708)‟, as they later commented on 
poststructuralist attempts to use LPT. 
 
Managerial labour process: managers as workers? 
But what is the substance of the argument, the charge raised against Armstrong? W. 
reasons that Armstrong‟s rejection of a managerial labour process is „dangerous‟, the 
                                                 
1 This is not to be interpreted as an out-of-time attempt at reasserting class primacy but as a reminder, 
surfaced significantly during the latest ILP2008 conference, that LPT cannot be used to explain 
everything; secondly, to highlight that the significance of the issue does not necessarily stand for the 
appropriateness of the approach. Institutional CT and postcolonial studies stand to their radical 
predecessors very much like initial analyses and struggles around imperialism and patriarchy compare 
to the mockery of governmental equality agendas which the former have inspired, very much to the 
delight of employers and HRM practitioners. 
danger consisting in assuming an „identity between managerial work and oppressive 
practices of capitalist relations‟2, therefore reducing management to a capital function 
and obscuring its contradictions. The point is based around the distinction between 
productive and unproductive labour. Here, as we saw earlier, W. first praises the 
heuristic value of the distinction, but charges A. with mistakenly using it
3
 to draw 
fault lines between workers and managers, then he not only states that it is impossible 
to assign a uniquely unproductive quality to manager‟s work but also to a single 
managerial task. He goes further, though, stating that the worker‟s job too is a 
combination of the two forms of labour. Therefore, their condition is not 
fundamentally different. There are a number of problems with this line of argument. 
In terms of critique it fails to see that A. himself rejected from the beginning the idea 
of conflating the distinction between manual and intellectual work with the 
productive/unproductive divide, and declared no interest in looking into the 
productive aspects of managerial work (Armstrong, 1984). Therefore, even if the 
position of W. on the distinction is plausible, the fact remains unchallenged that: a) 
the nature of management is determined by its control (and decision-making) function 
and b) the position of managers is determined by their location in capitalist 
hierarchies. Asserting a class divide between „worker‟ and „manager‟ carries into 
class analysis the risk of reducing it to a Weberian classification exercise. Warning 
against the latter Willmott and Smith (1996) recommend we should rather concern 
ourselves with relations than with positions. But it is precisely on this ground, the 
understanding of the owner-management relationship, the attempt to uncover its 
constraints and dynamics, that A. justifies the need for a separate agency relationship. 
Secondly, despite similarities with the worker-manager relationship, it is the 
hierarchical dimension in which this set of relations is dynamically interconnected 
that makes the equivalence between manager‟s and worker‟s position vis-à-vis capital 
untenable. Willmott‟s case study material seems to point in this direction: the stated 
centrality of professionalism to manager‟s identity, their „recalcitrance to pressures 
from above‟ and the greater „freedom to misbehave‟ indicate that they might not be 
mere functionaries of capital and yet very much unlike workers. Willmott‟s argument 
                                                 
2 Here W.  (ibid., p. 1336) quotes A. „conceptualising management only as “a means of degrading . . . 
manual labour” (Armstrong, 1989, p. 309). The quote is actually referred in the original text to 
„capitalist administration‟ while a more appropriate definition of managerial work by A. as „decision-
making and control‟ is to be found elsewhere (Armstrong, 1989, p. 311). 
3 See A. (1984) on his view of functionalism, productive and manual labour. 
relies also on the idea that manager‟s and worker‟s labours are not fundamentally 
different as they are both controllers and controlled. On the workers‟ side, this allows 
him to „make sense‟ of TQM schemes, yet it is precisely the evidence on worker‟s 
participation in these schemes, well researched and highly debated within LPT, that 
deprives this aspect of a solid empirical base (Harrison, 1994; Edwards & Wright, 
2001; Thompson, 2003, 2005). 
Managerial agency: collective projects v. individual identity 
What about the danger of functionalism? A. focuses on the development of the control 
function, looking at managers collectively as professions, which, in an autonomous 
exercise of self-promotion, are able to design control strategies consistent with their 
specific ideology. Yet their success in winning the support of owners hinges on such 
strategies satisfying the need of capital at a particular historical time. In this way, he 
generates true, i.e. historical, causation. So, W. seems to say, is not this a case where 
once again management is seen as emerging as an unconditional ally of capital, is this 
not a more sophisticated way to obliterate any contradiction between owners and 
managers and restore the uncompromising orthodox belief that capital always wins? 
Actually Armstrong has a lot to say about managers as controllers but little about their 
condition as controlled. In a context like the Russian one where managers, particularly 
production managers, are locked in a bitter conflict with owners, have their old 
prerogatives challenged and resist hard budget constraints, promoting self-consciously 
their own agenda, Willmott‟s alternative focus on „recalcitrant‟ identities might be 
more promising in uncovering the causes and directions of this struggle. W. argues 
that relations in production are reproduced though the existential media of human 
conduct and this can only be understood by recovering subjectivity. He does so by 
focusing on „the materiality of the human subject‟, the struggle to gain a sense of 
purpose and identity. From this we can proceed to understand managerial „resistance‟ 
as „motivated by a defensive concern to secure an identity built upon their 
contradictory and precarious positioning with capitalist relations of production‟ 
(Willmott, 1997, p. 1353). In constructing such an approach, W. shows how managers 
can thwart performance-oriented initiatives in order to reinforce their professional 
identity and their status, i.e. their strategies can foil capitalist „objectives and 
motives‟. Surprisingly, this ought not to be in contradiction with the A. idea of the 
dynamic of trust and control in professions if only capitalist relations of production 
were not but in name put aside. Managers then become representatives of a universal 
human condition subjected as individuals to an equally abstracted mechanism of 
control. We have talked already about the „fragility‟ of the „post-modern subject‟, 
here it is important to highlight its, individualistic and narrow, understanding of social 
action which fails to account for collective strategies. For agency to be conducive to 
social change and identity to play any role in it as a subjective medium4, what matters 
is collective projects not individual identity, ideology rather than emotions. This is not 
dissolving the individual into an undistinguished mass or reducing it to an economic 
category but to appreciate it as a well-rounded historical agent. Once an historical 
context is introduced, it becomes possible to ask in what sense managers are agents or 
targets of control and why; when their identity and strategies are consistent with the 
development of capitalist relations and what are the consequences if they are not.  
Summary: Management, history and capitalist contradictions 
Managers are agents of capital but not its obedient functionaries, their control 
strategies are mediated though their identities and reflect very much their interests as 
they might do (partially) the objectives of capitalist owners. Managers entrusted with 
this function enjoy a privileged position in return. Yet, managers are also the targets 
of controls „intended to make their agency more predictable and profitable‟ (ibid., p. 
1347). The manager-owner relationship is therefore contradictory, but to understand 
its terms and dynamics and, ultimately, its place in capitalist relations requires 
providing historical depth and context to the analysis of managerial work and 
ideologies. The dynamics of trust and control delineated by A. at least partially fills 
this gap. Historically, owners have relied on managerial professions but have 
dispensed with trust (of one profession in favour of another) to take advantage of the 
economies in the agency relationship. The struggle between professions and the 
delegation (fissures) within them provide an explanation for managerial „deskilling‟ 
but also highlight its fundamental difference relative to labour.  
 
                                                 
4 This is precluded in Willmott‟s approach as he rejects the objective character of the „superstructural‟, 
i.e. cultural, dimension of social relations; and not surprisingly so, given the misappropriation that CT 
makes of Gramsci‟s concept of hegemony.  
 Managerial agency in Russia: What can Armstrong explain that Willmott 
cannot? 
The last decade in Russia has seen bitter confrontation between, predominantly 
enterprise production managers and (new capitalist) owners. The story goes that 
managerial resistance should be accredited to an exercise of narrow self-interest, 
„coloured‟ by a „conservative‟ soviet, if not Russian, mentality. Both top and middle 
management would be found defending a system that granted them sweeping powers 
while making them unaccountable for, widely observed, poor performance5.  
Critics of mainstream approaches have found this argument wanting. It has been 
observed that managerial behaviour could not be reduced to entrenchment and that the 
defence of the labour collective and relations therein could be better interpreted as an 
attempt to establish a form of social dialogue. This argument, by the way, suggests 
that looking at collective strategies rather than individual identities offers greater 
explanatory potentials apart from avoiding the risk of engaging in fruitless blame-
games against resistance to change. Findings from research in management 
restructuring and labour relations highlight how enterprise management‟s unwelcome 
reception of market reforms have much to do with structural constraints posed by the 
soviet system of social relations in production as well as the particular business 
environment created by market reforms at macro-level. Furthermore, they find out 
that capitalist owners, including foreign ones, are no less keen than red executives in 
employing soviet-type control mechanism and personnel management tactics.  
Issues of control, resistance and change are central to understanding owner-manager 
relations and the dynamics of enterprise restructuring in Russia, which therefore 
provides a significant test case for approaches to managerial behaviour as discussed in 
the previous section. In particular research findings, including our own, point to a) 
control and trust as presented by A. as key aspects of the managerial social 
relationship, and reveal, very much unlike Willmott‟s, b) the centrality, and relative 
autonomy, of social relations in production in constraining such relationship and c) 
the importance of soviet (historical) legacies and external (market and political) 
                                                 
5 A system that a foreign consultant described as a combination of authoritarian rule, decision-making 
on every affair concentrated right at the top, and co-operative administration, operational decisions 
over underspecified objectives being open to bargaining with operatives in charge of implementation. 
The latter providing both practical sustainability, in the form of actual decentralisation, and political 
legitimation, a moral economy of fairness, to inside management domination. 
contingencies, in shaping respectively managers‟ (and owners‟) objectives and 
decision-making. The next sections will present case material on managerial control, 
trust, deskilling and agency which will clarify, and hopefully substantiate, these 
claims.  
 
The centrality of Control 
 
Control as a capitalist function is the defining aspect of managerial work: Willmott 
cannot explain a) why capitalists tolerate managerial recalcitrance and make room 
for a larger than expected allowance towards managerial misbehaviour, b) when and 
to what extent are managerial strategies compatible with capitalist interests; 
 
One of the key tenets of transition was that the re-establishment of the „market 
economy‟ would restore the natural order of things; e. g. put managers to manage and 
workers to work. Conflict between managers and owners about the effective use of 
resources has proved such prediction to be a much harder task to achieve than initially 
expected. At shop level, issues concerning the use of labour and wage-bargaining 
have resisted scrutiny in the face of attempts by managers at retaining their 
discretional use as a way to elicit workers efforts and reward key workers. 
In order to understand this point it is important to return to the peculiarity of the 
Soviet economic system, which rests on the limited control of the elites over the 
labour process (Arnot 1988; Filtzer, 1992; Ticktin, 1992). From the point of view of 
the economic bureaucracy, managers had to be relied upon to generate and execute 
plan orders; but, to the extent that such tasks implied managers‟ mobilisation of 
labour collectives, they also forced them constantly to distort and falsify plan targets. 
From the point of view of managers the problem consisted in the expected inability of 
the system to provide sufficient resources to meet the expectations of the leadership. 
The use of tight planning and the recurrent innovation campaigns launched by the 
leadership to enforce productivity growth and innovation countervailed by managers, 
resisting modernisation, represent the conflictual dynamics generated by this 
contradiction. The temporary composition of interests in Soviet management rested 
on the fact that managerial practices represent ultimately an effective form of social 
control consistent with the then primary objective of eliciting workers‟ efforts towards 
the fulfilment of planned physical output.  
The problem arises when, with privatisation and then with the appearance of outside 
ownership, demands from above gradually shift towards the achievement of financial 
and quality objectives, i.e. from product to commodity, introducing a new set of 
contradictions, namely between the production of things and the generation of profit, 
familiar to the management of the capitalist enterprise but alien to Soviet management 
and the system of social relations upon which it relies. The incorporation of formerly 
independent privatised enterprises into holdings, the financial –industrial groups, has 
provided a governance framework within which conflicts arising from these 
contradictions are articulated. Under this arrangement enterprise management, as the 
secretary of one of this groups put it, is reverted to its original functions, production 
and personnel, while finance and commerce are dealt with at group level. As Clarke 
(2007) observes, the relationship between groups and subsidiaries are characterised by 
the tension between top executives, informed by market individualism, and enterprise 
management still purportedly acting in defence of the „collective‟ interests of their 
production unit. Within enterprises, this translates in the rhetoric of the labour 
collective and use of traditional soviet methods of work organisation and social 
control. Findings from case study research (Morrison et al. 2003, 2007) indicate that 
such managerial practices, centred on the use of discretional pay systems and direct 
disciplinary methods, aim at retaining a co-operative arrangement with key cadre 
workers and ultimately a form of (limited) control over the production process6. This 
soviet type management, based on continuous bargaining, appears increasingly at 
odds with demands for economies and increases in productivity whenever the 
monopolistic strength of the group is unable to shelter the enterprise from competitive 
pressures7.  
If managerial resistance in the Russian enterprise is rather against capitalist 
management than within it, in what sense it is significant to our case? Because it tells 
us that a) the control function is central to managerial work and b) that, when 
capitalist priorities of accumulation appear, managerial control strategies have to 
accommodate them8. Comparatively, the obsession of Russian managers for 
controlling labour is generally contrasted to their western counterparts‟ concern for 
                                                 
6 So, for example, cadre workers praised the piece-rate for „forcing workers to work‟ but, as a manager 
respondent observes, this system always implies some discretion on the part of workers as to how 
results are achieved and how much effort they put into it. 
7 A key respondent working as head of production, referred to it as „democratic‟ management as 
opposed to the „authoritarian‟ methods employed by new (capitalist) owners. He later accepted that the 
former is not compatible with market-oriented production. 
8 As our manager and worker respondents came to realise the priority for new capitalist owners was not 
simply to put to test their organisational, technical or leadership skills but to direct them to specific 
financial and quality, i.e. market, targets.  
other areas of managerial work. What the experience of transition suggests, though, is 
that this might be ascribed to the fact that control over labour in mature capitalist 
countries, since Ford and Taylor, is incomparably greater, and that workers‟ (and 
petty managers‟) autonomous decision-making is the first victim of the development 
of capitalist management. 
Russian capitalist owners have to rely on managerial strategies to retain control over 
workers in the shops but they entails considerable waste which is not tolerable in the 
long run. Why they do not proceed with restructuring, then? An answer to this 
question requires scrutinising the managerial relationship further, looking into the 
state of manager-owner relations. 
 
The social nature of trust 
 
Trust rather than expertise is the essential component of the manager owner 
relationship, albeit contradictory: Willmott fails it when presupposes that trust or 
lack of it is equally shared among employees, i.e. workers and managers are both 
controlled. 
 
One of the consequences of limited control over the production process in the soviet 
system was a conflictual and distrustful relationship among the agents distributed 
along the hierarchy of its centralised command structure, and particularly between 
enterprise managers and overarching bodies. Consistently with Armstrong‟s thesis, 
lack of trust was compensated by cumbersome control over managerial decision 
making. Such a feature of soviet management according to Clarke (2007) has not been 
yet modified by private (capitalist) ownership and our ethnographic research suggests 
that lack of trust between managers and new owners has much to do with it. This line 
of argument raises two immediate objections, a) whether the conflict between 
managers and owners should not be regarded as a temporary feature resulting from 
the dramatic contingencies of economic slump and hostile takeovers and b) whether 
the use of administrative control and „direct interference‟ should equally do as a 
peculiarity of a  new (authoritarian) Russian capitalism. Relying on scholarship of the 
soviet system as well as the very accounts of our respondents we find petty tutelage a 
systemic feature of Russian management but, following Clarke, we will maintain this 
is not to stay with us if capitalist development reaches deeper in the management of 
individual economic units. 
To understand how the contradictory interrelation of trust and control operates at the 
level of manager‟s work it might be useful to listen to their own account of how the 
„system‟ works (and why it does not any more). As a respondent brilliantly put it, the 
manager-owner relationship is based on a „great deceit‟ (Morrison, 2007b: 211), 
which he describes as a mechanism to stimulate managerial work by assigning 
unrealistic targets. Mistrust on the side of manager derives from the conviction that 
above-plant bodies will not provide resources to achieve assigned targets. The latter in 
turn will rest on the belief that managers exaggerate their needs or even falsify results 
to avoid punishment and have an easy way with the plan. In soviet times, generalised 
scarcity forced managers to cut corners in order to achieve results the best they could, 
prioritising output over quality and costs. Strict controls were intended to enforce 
rationing and keep managers under the constant pressure through fear of punishment 
for failure. During the transition period, the new owners, in order to cut costs and 
waste, are inducing scarcity of funds and materials hoping that managers would find a 
solution. This system stifles initiative and prevents development as well as fuelling 
mistrust. „Now, managerial turnover is high‟, the same respondent explains, ‟because 
owners are desperate to find who can push the red button that would turn losses into 
profit‟, only that‟ successful managers get promoted and their wisdom follows them, 
leaving their workplace once again in the dark‟. For the same reasons, blaming 
failures on individuals leads to underestimating systemic problems while breading 
either excessive conscious or reckless behaviour in managers overburdened with 
responsibilities. 
Managers in our case study enterprises have sought to get over this impasse by 
working for reforms aimed at standardising procedures and making managerial work 
more transparent for owners to see but also more reliable for managers to work with9. 
The experience has been so far disappointing: top executives have felt that 
normalising relations with subordinates might deprive them of an essential control 
stick wile subordinates have shown unwillingness to volunteer information about their 
„strategies‟ for fear of reprisals. One of the consequences is that whatever solution 
managers might find will not translate into innovation as western managerial common 
                                                 
9 In itself the case presents a routine attempt at introducing western managerial technologies. What is 
remarkable here is managers‟ conviction that its introduction is not simply meant to address „human 
factor‟ failures but to replace the very culture of blame and the underpinning control system that feeds 
on them. It is equally significant that former red executives might come to identify the latter as a 
specifically soviet control system and distance themselves from such system once the external 
contingencies and systemic pressures under which they operate changed. 
sense will dictate. While on the other side owners are made quite reluctant to invest 
and grant decision-making powers to untrustworthy subordinates10. 
This can contribute to explain the frailty of Russian economic recovery at micro level 
and its poor development perspectives. It also leads us to conclude that trust between 
managers and owner is a crucial ingredient in establishing capitalist management of 
Russian companies. Controlling managers and workers alike, as one of our respondent 
put it, was the first mistake of the post-privatisation era leaders. Resistance and 
mistrust by managers cannot be the norm.  
Lack of trust between managers and owners represent the definite limit to successfully 
pursuing restructuring. The use of administrative controls and over-centralised 
decision-making that frustrates managerial initiative is the pathological manifestation 
of this condition. When managers act consciously to gain the trust of new owners, in 
order to claim decision-making powers and economic rewards, they present 
themselves as reformers able to deliver efficiency via the implementation of control 
and monitoring systems.  
While we maintain that the point made above concerns the Russian management 
system in general, evidence suggests that production and other managers in 
manufacturing have been those suffering, and therefore resisting most transition. The 
issue should be raised therefore about the different impact of capitalist development 
on different professions within management, i.e. whether control and resistance have 
to do with the deskilling of a particular group of managers. 
 
Deskilling as fissure 
 
Deskilling in management has to be understood as an extension of the division of 
labour in the capital function: A managerial labour process cannot explain cases 
when deskilling does not occur in the case of management;  
 
One problem that has tainted post-soviet restructuring consists in the practically 
conflicting requirements of subordinating operational managers to entrepreneurial 
executives but also to have the former adopting a market-oriented mentality and 
imposing discipline over workers. Capitalist development in Russia has led to finance 
                                                 
10 The answer emerging from the accounts of respondents points to the absence of trust as a primary 
determinant of this impasse. Owners quite reasonably expect managers to deliver in terms of cutting 
costs, raising quality and reducing the workforce‟s indiscipline to acceptable levels. Managers at 
almost all levels feel deprived of the autonomy, the material resources and the rewards which they 
deem essential for achieving these goals.  
 
and commerce eroding the once dominant position of the production function. 
Production managers complain of loss in status, actual limitation of prerogatives and 
discrimination in pay. These problems are particularly acute among lower and petty 
managers as they feel an unsustainable pressure to deliver while confronting ever 
growing limitations to traditional informal methods. It is reported that in privatised 
enterprises this may led to line managers identifying themselves with subordinate 
workers and taking their sides against superiors. Russian analysts report on these 
issues in terms of „problems of integration of line managers‟ (Goncharova, 2005).  
Responses vary depending on type of ownership and process but FIG controlled 
enterprises present the following path. On the one side, top managers have resorted to 
exclusionary practices towards old „recalcitrant‟ cadres, aimed at ultimately replacing 
them with younger, market oriented managers; on the other side, policies of 
integration are seen in operation: the granting of better (as compared to workers) 
status and pay in order to clearly demarcate the workers manager divide11. These 
though have engendered problems in the manager-worker relationship. The expected 
solution, the research concludes, lies in greater „authoritarianism‟ of the shop chief12. 
Ultimately, it is expected that future managers (including line managers) will stand on 
the side of the enterprise and share the vision of top managers. To the extent that one 
recognises such strategies as pursuing deskilling, the „consummation of the real 
subordination of capital to labour‟ (Armstrong, 1984: 319), they seem to entail quite 
different though clearly interdependent processes: integrating managers, 
subordinating workers. Whether cultural change and generational turnover are 
sufficient means to such end, and in fact qualify as deskilling in a LP sense, it is 
another matter, though a theoretically as well as practically essential one. 
Deskilling of both workers and production managers should entail fragmentation and 
deskilling, i.e. subordination via division of labour, not just to qualify in principle, but 
to achieve practically effective control of the labour process. Lack of it in most of the 
                                                 
11 A third strategy, referred by G. (2005) and observed in our case studies (Morrison, 2007), is 
delayering. Removing the people does not necessarily remove the problem. In the absence of a new 
division of labour, this move has proved to make matter worst in that it also removes a buffer between 
workers and managers. On the other side, the very heightening of confrontation it engenders might 
stimulate more resolute changes. 
12 This is a recurrent theme in fieldwork findings and a quite remarkable one. It is a potent reminder 
that what would be regarded as the „normal‟ exercise of managerial authority in capitalist conditions is 
perceived as an intolerable intrusion by those living in a different system. It is quite ironical too, given 
that such system was almost universally labelled as „authoritarian‟ by western liberals. Finally, it 
reinforces the argument that there is very little ambiguity in capitalist management. 
Russian cases, as anticipated by our discussion of control in the previous sections, 
might explain the unusual occurrence of managerial resistance. What line managers in 
our case studies resented most was the increasing chasm between their crucial role in 
production and the loss in status and pay; leading to confrontation with shop chiefs, 
described as „sitting in their office while all the work is done by foremen without any 
reward or recognition‟. As one put it boldly, „what we need all these managers for?‟ 
The situation is altogether different where greater responsibilities and more work are 
compensated by clearer (and narrower) tasks and more control. At this Moldova 
based-FDI exporting quality clothing, the reorganisation of managerial work and 
labour organisation has been sufficiently thorough to put former soviet managers at 
easy with the requirement of world manufacturing as well as confidently in control of 
supervisors and ordinary workers. True tells the shop chief, „now we have more 
responsibilities than before when one sat in the office in charge of yearly plans . . . 
now on a Monday we might hear that a customer requires thousand units of such and 
such item . . . many models and never the same . . . it is difficult but interesting . . . for 
me it is easy, because I know the technology, I can sit down and show you what I am 
capable to do. New electronic machinery is fast, you have to adjust to the pace or get 
worn off rapidly. If a worker does not understand so I tell her: “you do it this way!”. 
Discipline? At the end of the season, we check out „weak spots‟ - the sick, the truant - 
and get rid of them.‟ Line managers here have narrower, more definite tasks and work 
closely with the shop chief to organise and fine tune the production process. They all 
complain about the poor pay and the crazy work pace but „work on the machines is 
monotonous‟. They still retain some discretion „but‟ as one put it: „I can never say that 
something cannot be achieved: everything is possible if you try enough‟. It is workers 
who ultimately take the brunt, their responses not surprisingly portraying a case of 
material deprivation and exploitation. Such enthusiastic embracement of just-in-time 
production by line managers might raise reservations about the typicality of such case 
but in this corner of the former USSR marketisation and FDI-led restructuring have 
taken a clear turn towards differentiation of roles and conditions between managers 
and workers. Here, „foreign capitalists take some into management and these forget 
they belong to the same place as the other [workers, C. M.]‟, a top trade union official 
bitterly remarks. 
The Russian enterprise has not seen full scale rationalisation but this is not to say that 
nothing happened. Hard-budged constraints have led to a crude intensification of 
work. The loss of autonomy, intensification of work, and the decreasing success at 
bargaining are unevenly affecting workers and managers. Corporate policies pursuing 
the „integration‟ of line managers into the chain of command amidst increasing 
tensions in the shops between cadre workers and shop managers bear witness to quite 
different deskilling processes.  
Where new (particularly foreign) owners have successfully implemented western 
managerial techniques and work organisation this has led to increasing autonomy for 
managers but greater control over subordinates, developing new fault lines among 
managers and between mangers and workers. 
 
Conclusions 
What does the experience of post-soviet restructuring tell us? First we are confronted 
with the apparent paradox of managerial resistance being used to back Armstrong‟s 
argument directed ultimately against the very plausibility of managerial resistance 
under capitalism. On the other hand, one should also wonder whether the insistence 
of mainstream sources in blaming Russian managers‟ „resistance to change‟ might not 
be too laud a cry, i.e. a justification for the failures of transition? In fact, managerial 
„recalcitrance‟ in Russia, now as in the past, has more to do with room left for 
discretion than with resistance, yet this does not mean that it is not a real obstacle to 
the introduction of capitalist management in the enterprise. Whereas, the structural 
features of capitalism in the post-soviet space could be, roughly speaking, imposed by 
decree13, capitalist management of economic unit instead requires the willing and 
purposeful participation of management, their trust. Managers‟ own experience has 
come to appreciate it as an alternative to economic stagnation or personal 
annihilation, which result from collective or individual resistance.  
Where resistance stems from? Again paradoxically, it is the ambiguous position of the 
red executive, trained as an agent of the party-state but made into an autocratic leader 
of his or her labour collective that represents the problem. Such ambiguity has proved 
so far to be at odds with capitalism, i.e. hard-budget constraints and market-oriented 
restructuring. In fact it can only survive as a strategic, yet increasingly marginal tool 
of social control (and consent) in such way as E. P. Thompson‟s „customs in 
                                                 
13 It still required two coup d‟état (the failed coup in 1991 and the bombardment of the parliament in 
1993), the destruction of the economy and the death of several millions, this despite a strong initial 
support at least in principle by the general populace for privatisation. 
common‟ (Thompson, 2001) of the pre-industrial moral economy14. This echoes 
Armstrong‟s point (2008, pp. 6-7) against a reductionist approach to social 
structuration. Simply stressing the gulf between „deep‟ and „surface‟ structures would 
be quite reductive. What the study of change in managerial practices calls for is an 
appreciation of the relations these two levels entertain with each other. It becomes 
then possible to say that managerial practices do enact and reproduce social relations 
at any given historical time. Where historical means not only assuming legacies 
(cultural or institutional) from the past but a) dialectically reconnecting agents as 
social actors to the structures apparently constraining them as individuals; b) 
assuming a scale of analysis and narration appropriate to the social magnitude and 
anthropological depth of the transformation under scrutiny.15 
Soviet managerial practises are not simply sustained as a way to resist scrutiny and 
reassert authority over subordinated. They have been pursued with varying degree of 
awareness as part of a strategy to restore a social pact on the basis of the existing 
system of social relations. Managerial resistance to hard-budget constraints and 
outside owners‟ interference has been also an attempt to preserve the conditions under 
which material production and social reproduction are sustained. The problems and 
tasks deriving from adjustment by managers to the conditions of capitalist ownership 
cannot be deterministically presupposed but can only be recognised if managerial 
agency is reconnected with the materiality of social relation rather than the material of 
a solipsistically identitarian subjectivity, as historical rather than hysterical agents. 
What then about identities? The collapse of the Soviet Union has generated so deep a 
crisis that both individual and collective identities could hardly stay put. Why it would 
be impossible to even attempt to survey the post-soviet identity issue, it is both 
possible and necessary to look at changes in the relationship between identity and 
work. The most recent research on gender, employment and identities (Ashwin, 2006; 
Kay, 2006) indicates that professional identities do play a role in the chain of 
                                                 
14 To be sure, some would claim that autocratic and paternalistic forms of social control revived in 
many prosperous Russian companies might become permanent features of a distinctively Russian 
‟feudal‟ capitalism such as in US „Modern Manors‟. There is no reason to deny such possibility. This 
argument though fail to see the crucial structural change under way and the actual impossibility to 
retain a duality of power and organisational principles in economic co-operation that solely make sense 
of the catastrophic magnitude of such „counterrevolution‟.  
15  The failures of mainstream approaches at grasping managerial restructuring in a post-soviet context 
are a striking example of the consequences of overseeing such point. Reducing a regime change to a 
change in systems of administration such as those taking place in capitalist countries adopting neo-
liberal reforms missed the nature and scale of the task for resurging capital in the FSU. 
transformation unlashed by transition, yet, the outcomes seem confirming Armstrong 
argument. 16 Findings from research into gendered individual strategies come to two 
major conclusions: a) that is men who have suffered most from change, the reason 
being precisely the disproportionate role that work played in constructing their 
identity and sustaining their status; 2) that resistance to adaptation to a capitalist job 
market based on professional identity led in many cases to destitution (Ashwin, ibid.: 
92-108) and „rigidity and resistance to change were simply not and option‟ (Kay, 
ibid.: p. 81), leading the new generation to prioritise „income generation versus 
professionalism and the intrinsic value of high quality work‟ (ibid.: p. 95). A third 
point though also emerges that while changes affected most man and all professional-
oriented workers, still a different accent could be recognised in assessing job market 
changes: whereas a worker could sympathetically assert that in soviet times „a skilled 
man . . . used to be able to influence things‟, for those „with higher education‟ and 
„managerial responsibility‟ or entrepreneurial orientation „the freedoms of the Soviet 
system‟ existed only „in a negative sense‟ (ibid.: pp. 90-92). This reinforces the 
findings of our cases where they show that opportunities for self-assertion by 
managers as an outcome of transition are rather at the expense of workers. 17 The latter 
instead, as a trade union leader put it, „have been left nostalgically ruminating such 
idea: “I am working class”; yet, here you are just hired hands‟. They believe it to be 
„wild capitalism‟ but it sounds as much capitalism as it can be to me 
 
 
                                                 
16 Here we refer specifically to the counterargument „that identities in late capitalism are mostly 
constructed not through work‟ and when they do in the case of managers „not in the contrarian manner 
(Armstrong, 2008, p. 27) 
17 it is not that conflictual identities among workers could not be found at all, only that they could only 
make an impact within a collective or labour movement and cases of this kind have been found to these 
days to be rare and fragile. 
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